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Abstract 
In recent years, botnets have emerged as a serious threat on the Internet. Botnets are 
commonly used for exploits such as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, identity 
theft, spam, and click fraud. The immense size of botnets, some consisting of hundreds of 
thousands of compromised computers, increases the speed and severity of attacks. 
Unlike passive behavior anomaly detection techniques, active botnet detection aims to 
collect evidence actively, in order to reduce detection time and increase accuracy. In this 
project, we develop and analyze a botnet that we call ActiBot, which can evade some 
types of active detection mechanisms. Future research will focus on using ActiBot to 
strengthen existing detection techniques. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 What is a Bot? 
The word bot is short for ―robot.‖ In software, a bot is an automated program that can 
execute certain commands. Generally, bots are remotely controlled by a master via one or 
more controller hosts. The controller is often an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) server. IRC is 
normally used to relay messages among client terminals [13]. A first-generation bot is a 
program that interacts with a chat service to automate tasks for a human, such as creating 
chat logs. These chat bots were designed to help operate chat rooms, or to entertain chat 
users [1]. 
Today, the main use of bots is sending chat spam. Modern chat bots deliver spam URLs 
via either links in chat messages or user profile links. A single bot operator, controlling a 
few hundred bots, can distribute spam links to thousands of users, making chat bots very 
profitable to the bot operator, who is paid per generated click. Other potential abuses of 
bots include spreading malware, phishing, booting and similar malicious activities [1]. 
Compromised computers are controlled by malware, which is malicious software 
designed to break security. Compromised hosts are usually referred to as ―zombies.‖ 
 
1.2 Classification of Bots 
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Bots can be classified as benign, gray-area, or malicious. Here, we briefly discuss each of 
these categories.  
1.2.1Benign bots 
Benign bots include search bots, shopping bots, and telephony bots. These bots are used 
to automate basic and innocent tasks on Internet relay chat (IRC). For example, a 
searchbot is user’s own personal search robot that continuously searches the Internet 
trying to find all the best websites it can on user’s behalf. User can even ask a searchbot a 
question and it will talk to other searchbots to find an answer [17]. Such a benign bot 
provide us a more creative and convenient life. Some other countless examples can be 
found at bot knowledge website [14].  
1.2.2 Gray-area bots 
This category refers to bots that are neither clearly benign nor clearly malicious. Some 
examples of gray-area bots include Blogbots, xdcc, fserve bots and Trainer bots 
(MMORPGs) [5]. Blogbots is open-sourced software for Microsoft Outlook and Internet 
Explorer that allows users to subscribe to RSS or ATOM feeds. Right now, just about 
every web-site, blog, wiki or newsletter is supporting this format [15]. Using such bots is 
a new way to put the internet to work for users. 
1.2.3 Malicious bots 
Malicious bots are designed to coordinate and conduct attacks on networked computers. 
Examples of such attacks include denial-of-service [2], identity theft and sending mass 
spam. Spambot is one of the popular malicious bots, which is designed to collect, or 
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harvest, e-mail addresses from the Internet. A spambot starts out on a web page. It scans 
the page for two things: hyperlinks and email addresses. It stores the email addresses to 
use as targets for spam, and follows each hyperlink to a new page, starting the process all 
over [18]. Another example is the zombie computer (often shortened as a zombie), it is a 
computer connected to the Internet that has been compromised by a cracker, computer 
virus or trojan horse can be used to perform malicous task or launch DoS attack [16]. 
Most owners of zombie computers are unaware that their system is being used in this way. 
There are a lot more examples we can find out in the world. All of these bots have some 
key characteristics including process forking with network and file access, and 
propagation potential [16]. 
1.3 What is Botnet? 
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Figure 1: How a botnet is used to send email spam 
The word botnet is a combination of the words robot and network. A botnet is a 
collection of zombie computers that are controlled by a ―botmaster‖ [3]. Such a collection 
of compromised computers is usually built up over a long period of time. A botnet can be 
employed to unleash a DDoS (distributed denial of service) attack or used to send very 
large quantities of spam. DDoS attack relies primarily on brute force attack, flooding the 
target with an oversaturating flux of packets, using up the resources of targeted system or 
depleting its connection bandwidth. In February 2007, more than 10,000 online game 
servers in games such as Halo, Return to Castle Wolfenstein, Counter-Strike and many 
others were attacked by the hacker group RUS. The DDoS attack was made from more 
than a thousand computer units located in the republics of the former Soviet Union, 
mostly from Russia, Uzbekistan and Belarus. Minor attacks are still continuing to be 
made today [2].  
Botnets’ size could vary from tens to hundreds of thousands of systems, and one single 
botnet may cross plenty of homes, corporate and educational networks [19]. Botnets are 
usually used as zombies for executing a variety of malicious tasks [4]. The size of botnets 
and their potential power to attack afforded by the combination their processing potency 
and bandwidth have resulted to a general understanding that botnets are major threat to 
the network security, due to the low cost of conducting a botnet attack. Kaspersky 
Laboratories has researched price of botnet attacks in chat rooms and clandestine 
websites and found the following [20]: 
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 Hiring a botnet for DDoS attacks costs from $50 to thousands of dollars for a 
continuous 24-hour attack. 
 Stolen bank account details vary from $1 to $1,500 depending on the level of 
detail and account balance. 
 Personal data capable of allowing the criminals to open accounts in stolen names 
costs $5 to $8 for US citizens. 
 A list of one million emails addresses costs between $20 and $100; spammers 
charge $150 to $200 extra for doing the mailshot. 
 Targeted spam mailshots can cost from $70 for a few thousand names to $1,000 
of tens of millions of names. 
 User accounts for paid online services and games stores such as Steam go for $7 
to $15 per account. 
 Phishers pay $1,000 to $2,000 a month for access to fast flux botnets, which is a 
DNS technique used by botnets to hide phishing and malware delivery sites 
behind an ever-changing network of compromised hosts acting as proxies.  
 Spam to optimize a search engine ranking is about $300 per month. 
From this research data, we can see that a low-cost botnet attack could result in 
significant harm and losses.  
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1.4 Classification of Botnets 
Many papers try to provide taxonomy of botnets [22], using properties such as the 
propagation mechanism, the topology of Command and Control (C&C) infrastructure 
used the exploitation strategy, or the set of commands available to the perpetrator. It is 
known that botnets have thousands of different implementations, which can be classified 
into two major categories based on their topologies. The most common type is a C&C 
botnet. C&C botnets have a centralized architecture, which has enabled researchers to 
develop some feasible countermeasures to detect and destroy such botnets [23, 24]. 
Hence, newer and more sophisticated botnets often use Peer to Peer (P2P) technologies. 
1.4.1 Command and Control botnet 
A botmaster uses command and control (C&C) channel to command his/her bot army to 
carry out a variety of tasks. Though developers of botnet own the capability to create new 
C&C protocols, communications of the most contemporary C&C botnet are built on top 
of some popular protocols like IRC (Internet Relay Chat) and HTTP.  
As HTTP botnets use HTML to communicate, naturally they try to blend into normal 
HTTP traffic, but HTTP botnets are also hosted on legitimate (hacked) websites and they 
use specially registered domain names for their purpose. One major advantage of HTTP 
based botnets over traditional C&C botnet is the fact that more information can be easily 
presented to the botmaster [6]. But as the most popular botnets, IRC-based botnet use 
IRC protocol for text-based instant messaging over the Internet. It is based on 
client/Server (C/S)model but suited for distributed environment as well [25].  
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The attacker’s operations on IRC-based botnet have four stages. 
1. The creation stage is where the attacker may add malicious code or just modify an 
existing one out of numerous highly configurable bots over the Internet [26]. 
2. The configuration stage occurs when the IRC server and channel information is 
collected. As long as the bot is installed on the victim, it will automatically 
connect to the selected host [26]. Then, the attacker may restrict the access and 
secure the channel to the bots for business or some other purpose 
3. The third stage is the infection stage, where bots are propagated by various direct 
and indirect means [26]. As the name implies, direct techniques exploit 
vulnerabilities of the services or operating systems and are usually associated with 
the use of viruses.  
4. The final stage is the control stage, where the attacker can send the instructions to 
a group of bots via IRC channel to perform some malicious tasks. 
1.4.2 P2P botnets 
P2P botnets is a peer-to-peer network of bots that perform malicious task as both a client 
and a server. Newer botnets are almost entirely P2P, with command-and-control 
embedded into the botnet itself. By being dynamically updateable and variable they can 
evade having any single point of failure. Commanders can be identified solely through 
secure keys and all data except the binary itself can be encrypted. For example, a spyware 
program may encrypt all suspected passwords with a public key hard coded or distributed 
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into the bot software. Only with the private key, which only the botmaster has, can the 
data that the bot has captured be read [7]. 
1.4.4 What’s our target 
Although recently HTTP-based botnets and P2P botnets have drawn considerable 
attention, we must keep in mind that one consistent and major threat to network security 
is still from the IRC-based botnets. It’s still one of common form of botnet all over the 
world, as shown in Figure 2 [21]. The simplicity and flexibility fulfilled by the IRC’s 
text-based protocol could attribute to the consistence communication channels of IRC-
based botnet. 
Moreover, nowadays IRC botnets have been developed to a new state in which the 
content of C&C IRC messages is obfuscated by exploiting a foreign language, a custom 
sign, or some simple obfuscation techniques like hashing, XOR, or simple substitution. 
There is no difficulty for these botnets to evade most of the existing and popular botnet 
detection method like behavior-based approaches and signature-based detection by using 
obfuscated IRC messages (e.g., ―hi‖ instead of ―print‖).   
This is a truth that we’ve found that obscure C&C communications have been utilized in 
a number of existing IRC-based botnets.  More and more attackers/botmasters are using 
IRC bots to channel Trojans containing viruses and worms onto unsuspecting Internet 
users' computers. IRC is one of the earliest versions of Internet ―chatting,‖ and is still 
widely used by groups of people with common interests. So bots were originally used by 
IRC members to manage access lists, run quizzes, or serve files, which make an IRC bot 
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more difficult to be recognized on internet by pretending an ―IRC‖ human user. 
Recognizing an IRC bot infected machine is not always easy by passively collecting 
evidence. It has already become a hot topic for most of the information security scientist.  
 
Figure 2: Distribution of C&C botnets 
2. Botnet Detection 
Botnet detection is a detection technology aiming to detect any bot-infected host in 
network by collecting evidence. Those detection methods could be classified into two 
classifications: passive detection and active detection. Active botnet detection method is 
an innovated and unique technology, which was raised by a study group in SRI 
International, Texas A&M University, and Georgia Institute of Technology [8]. 
Nevertheless most of the existing botnet detection is passive detection, which means 
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collecting evidence passively after any damage happens. Like the intrusion detection, 
passive botnet detection has two subcategories: Behavior-based botnet detection and 
signature-based botnet detection.  
2.1 Behavior-based botnet detection 
By monitoring the behavioral anomalies, behavior-based botnet detection approaches are 
proposed and utilized to detect botnets. Many such systems have been developed in the 
past few years [27] [28] [29]. Behavior-based botnet detection techniques assume that an 
intrusion could be detected by observing a deviation from normal or expected behavior of 
the system or the users [30]. The model which defines what normal and valid behavior is 
extracted from reference information collected by various means. The botnet detection 
system later compares this model with the current activity. When a deviation is observed, 
an alarm is generated. In other words, anything that does not correspond to a previously 
learned behavior is considered infection. Therefore, the botnet detection system might be 
complete (i.e. all infections should be caught), but its accuracy is a difficult issue, which 
means you will get considerable false alarms [8].  From the below figure, you can easily 
find the false alarm rate of one behavior-based detection system. The average of false 
positive over negative is about 1.4%, which would be a real concern to the users. 
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Figure 3: An example of the false alarm rate of a behavior-based detection system 
 
Advantages of behavior-based approaches are that they can detect attempts to exploit new 
and unforeseen infection. They can even contribute to the (partially) automatic discovery 
of these new attacks [30]. They are less dependent on operating system-specific 
mechanisms. 
The high false alarm rate is generally cited as the main drawback of behavior-based 
techniques because the entire scope of the behavior of an information system may not be 
covered during the learning phase. Also, behavior can change over time, introducing the 
need for periodic online retraining of the behavior profile, result to either in unavailability 
of the botnet detection system or in additional false alarms [31]. 
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2.2 Signature-based botnet detection 
Majority of the commercial products are based on signatures which examine the traffic 
looking for well known patterns of attack [32]. Signature-based detection system 
monitors packets sending back and forth in the network and compares with predefined 
and preconfigured attack patterns which are known as signatures. But the problem is that 
there will be lag time between signature being applied for detecting a new threat and the 
new threat discovered. During this lag time the detection system will be not able to 
identify the threat [33]. 
Key advantage of using signature based detection method is that signatures are easy to 
develop and understand if you know what network behavior you're trying to identify (that 
is, if you already have a copy of the exploit). However, with tools like Metasploit and 
new obfuscation techniques it provides this task is becoming difficult but still achievable 
to some extent [33]. 
The events generated by a signature-based botnet detection system can very precisely 
inform you about what caused the alert. Some of the modern logging systems also allow 
you to attach packet-captures with every event triggered making it easy to research on the 
issue 
However, all these techniques above have its own limitations. Group analysis is used by 
some techniques to detect botnet. Nevertheless, those techniques request the occurrence 
of certain amount of bots in the network being monitored. What’s more, they could not 
really work while in the network there is just one infected host. Moreover, some other 
detection techniques may request more time to gather enough evidence to improve it 
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self’s confidence to identify a botnet [8]. For example, an offline correlation engine that 
executes daily group analysis on C-plane data is running in BotMiner [27]. Although 
BotSniffer is one more agile technique, which in its spatio-temporal correlation still 
request to observe some rounds of communication to collect enough evidence [29]. To 
claim an infection, BotHunter apply a primary signature-based approach to detect bot-
infected host, which also requires monitoring the communication or performance from 
several stages of the bot lifecycle as well in order to help the detection system with 
enough confidence. In contrast, real-world IRC-based botnet C&C communications can 
be quiet, i.e., some have infrequent C&C interactions because the botmaster is not always 
online to command the bot army. If the frequency of C&C interaction is low enough, 
botnets could possibly evade the detection of these systems [8]. Indeed, stealthy botnets 
with small sizes, obfuscated C&C dialogs, and infrequent C&C interactions pose an 
ongoing challenge to the malware research community. 
To address this challenge, a new botnet detection system explores a new botnet detection 
technique which is able to collect evidence actively. The following questions are 
answered by active botnet detection: Can we still claim a bot-infection with a high 
confidence by only observing one round of obscure chat-like botnet C&C communication? 
How about zero round? Active botnet detect is the solution [8] which is able to achieve 
the goal to detect a lot of existing IRC botnets and complement some current detection 
approaches in the world. 
24 
 
3. Active botnet detection - BotProbe 
Some authors believe that it is almost impossible to indentify obscure chat-like botnet 
command and control (C&C) communications with traditional signature-based 
techniques, because it looks like similar to human-to-human communication, which 
means it is indistinguishable for computer system[8]. As mentioned above, the passive 
behavior-based anomaly detection techniques which exist nowadays either needs to keep 
monitoring several bot-infected hosts that belong to one botnet or require certain time 
period in collecting evidence, which makes their effect limited. In [8], the potential of 
active botnet probing techniques is exploited by the author as a middlebox in the network, 
which aims to complement and augment the existing passive botnet C&C detection 
approaches, it is able to easily identify infrequent C&C communication and obfuscated 
content in C&C message in small botnets. What’s more, an algorithmic framework is 
introduced in [8]. To distinguish botnet C&C communications from human-human 
conversations, it implements a prototype system named BotProbe by using hypothesis 
testing with considerable accuracy. They also conducted server experiment on multiple 
real-world IRC bots, the result of which in this paper prove that obscure and obfuscated 
botnet communications can be successfully identified by their proposed active botnet 
detection techniques. They also conduct a study with real-world user on hundreds of 
participants, which indicates that when it comes to human-to-human communication the 
active botnet detection techniques have a very low false positive rate. A discussion on 
BotProbe’s limitations is presented as well.  New directions and ideas are expected to be 
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inspired in the feasibility study by using active botnet detection techniques in the 
malware research and botnet research communities. 
3.1 Key observation 
Active botnet detection posits that we should apply active execution of selecting 
suspicious interaction rather than passively monitoring two-way network traffic to better 
identify the communication of botnet. This strategy of detection named active botnet 
probing is based on the following two observations [8]. 
1. A clear command-response pattern could be found in a typical botnet C&C 
interaction. Thus to a certain dialog replays, a stateless bot is supposed to act 
deterministically, while it will be a nondeterministic interaction with a human-
controlled end point. 
2. Second, unlike humans, bots has limited tolerance for typographical errors 
during communication, because of their being preprogrammed to respond to 
the set of commands they receive. 
3.2 Active probing techniques 
Based on both key observations above, active botnet detection is used in BotProbe system, 
using the following active probing techniques. 
P0: Explicit-Challenge-Response  
There is one example explicit validation mechanism where educated users knowingly 
participate in the BotProbe scheme. A reverse Turing test would be prompted for users to 
perform in the BotProbe system, when BotProbe first detect a new IRC session between 
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two IP addresses. The system might also redirect the internal human IRC users to visit a 
secure web site where users are required to parse a CAPTCHA. In computing, this is a 
typical challenge-response test widely used to distinguish a response is not made from a 
computer [9]. A small puzzle could also be added by BotProbe for the user to solve as an 
alternative way. With the help of this approach, BotProbe maybe able to identify a botnet 
channel before capturing actual C&C interaction, in another word, BotProbe doesn’t 
require observing any round of communication.  But this is a simple and effective 
technique which requires user tolerance, awareness, and compliance [8]. 
P1: Session-Replay-Probing 
The addresses of the servers are spoofed by the BotProbe monitor.  And other TCP 
packets would be appended by BotProbe replaying the same control command to the 
remote end for a number of times. If a bot is the client, it will probably perform responses 
that are deterministic (in regarding to both timing and content) [8]. 
P2: Session-Byte-Probing 
With this probing approach, a few bytes of the control command would be randomly 
permutes by the BotProbe monitor. Assume a bot is the client, and then it is expected to 
be highly sensitive to the changed commands by BotProbe in order to react quite 
differently and the whole packet may even be dropped. Nevertheless, a higher tolerance 
is expected for a human user chatting in an IRC channel for the typo errors of an IRC 
message. By interleaving strategies P1 and P2, this test might be repeated by BotProbe 
for several times as necessary until BotProbe has sufficient confidence and evidence to 
make a conclusion. The authors also discussed this algorithm (Interleaved-Binary-
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Response-Hypothesis) used in BotProbe in more detail in their paper [8]. Generally, this 
algorithm assume that the probability of a human user responses to tampered packets 
(interleaved P1 and P2 probing for example) with repeatable content is pretty low, which 
is near to ¼ [8]. But this probability of a bot with the response is observed as 1. The main 
benefit of this algorithm is that they could find out a general method to detect the third-
party access response which doesn’t need to depend on the signatures of content. 
We also note that in the same TCP session if subsequent C&C interactions occur, by 
inserting new TCP packets, the existing connections may be broken by approached P1 
and P2. To prevent this, the numbers of TCP packet (sequence and acknowledge) would 
be altered by their in-line botnet probing system along with checksums to specify a new 
TCP packets that are produced by the P1 and P2 probes. Plus, at the application level, 
certain amount of interference will also be introduced into current sessions by these two 
probing approached. Nevertheless, the authors find out that there is another probing 
technique (P3) that will not impact current sessions for their targeted IRC protocols [8]. 
P3: Client-Replay-Probing 
Users are allowed by IRC, like the other chat protocols, to send messages to each other 
directly. In this case, BotProbe create a new user which then logins to the channel being 
monitored and sends the captured command(s) to the suspicious client(s), acting as the 
botmaster. By using this approach, BotProbe will not break current connections, but 
achieve the same goal like P1 and P2 [8].  
P4: Man-In-The-Middle-Probing 
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None observed command packet is intercepted by any of the above techniques directly. 
But, in some situations, such as the simple replay-probing may not have effect in highly 
stateful C&Cs, BotProbe intercepts the new command, and performs message injection 
like a man-in-the-middle chat [8].  
P5: Multi-client-Probing 
However, there is an assumption for all the above techniques, which is to probe a session 
from one single client. In the network, when multiple likely infected clients being 
monitored are interacting with the same C&C server, BotProbe reduces the number of 
probing rounds needed to validate its hypothesis and distributes these probing approaches 
among multiple clients [8]. 
3.3 Limitations and possible evasions 
According to above, BotProbe only works on a number of assumptions. It is limited to a 
specific category of botnets which is using chatting-like C&C. Therefore, we can easily 
find out some limitations in BotProbe, based on which we will discuss some possible 
evasions as show below. 
3.3.1 Strong encryption evasion 
Those botnet C&C channels which adopt strong encryption obfuscation schemes, making 
them resilient to replay attacks, could not be identified by active probing techniques. 
Although, the existing passive botnet detection strategies are not able to detect such 
channels and most of the existing IRC botnets just use some or even don’t use such weak 
encryption schemes. So in order to avoid active botnet detection, all botnets should use 
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strongly encrypted communication. Arguably, using such strong encrypted 
communication in botnet sometimes may possibly expose the bots as suspicious and 
therefore not expected by botmasters in some cases. So in our case, we can use a 
symmetric key cipher to encrypt our communication and adopt timestamp to evade the 
replay probing technique. 
3.3.2 Timer-based evasion  
Some knowledgeable attackers would design bots to use programmed timers which could 
randomly and delay the response time (the time between the sending out a command and 
observing a response) greatly, or set a range of the number of one command which could 
be received from the botmaster in a certain time period [8].  
BotProbe replay one suspicious command in each detecting round using the P1 approach, 
then it records whether or not the response is expected, which is named Single-Binary-
Response-Hypothesis algorithm. A bot is able to evade BotProbe’s Single-Binary-
Response-Hypothesis algorithm potentially, with the help of such a timer described above. 
Nevertheless, this approach will do harm to the efficiency of the botnet since the 
botmaster is not able to send C&C to the botnet in a timely manner or perform some 
identical task(s) repeatedly in a certain time window. A possible implementation is to use 
a timer to delay the bots’ response time to the command from botmaster. 
3.3.3 Stateful C&C protocols 
The P1 and P2 probing techniques both have an assumption that the C&C protocol is 
stateless, i.e., BotProbe replays the captured command for certain times, and bots are 
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expected to always respond similarly to the replayed command. So in this case, a 
processor to process stateful command could be created by the botmaster in order to 
detect identical commands, e.g., by using sequence number or a timestamp within every 
command sent to make the simple replay probing technique ineffective. In our case, we 
would rather use timestamp to create an application-leveled stateful C&C protocol to 
detect duplicate commands. 
4. Possible evasion 
Since active botnet detection technology is still not perfect with such limitations 
discussed above. We’re trying to attack or evade the detection of BotProbe system by 
implementing an advanced obscure command and control channels botnet. In this botnet, 
we propose the following four main features: 
1. Using strong cipher to encrypt the communication. 
2. Adopt a timer to slow down the bot’s response. 
3. Apply mutli-channel communication between botmaster and bot. 
4. Using stateful communication 
4.1 Encrypted communication  
In our implementation, we adopt blowfish cipher, a strong symmetric block cipher, to 
encrypt the communication between botmaster and bot, since it is easy to be implemented 
and not suspicious, since symmetric block cipher is widely used in IRC communication. 
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4.1.1 Blowfish cipher 
 
Figure 4: Blowfish cipher 
Blowfish comes within a large scale encryption products and cipher suites. Its good 
encryption rate in software is quite impressive and there is not any effective cryptanalysis 
found to date [34].  
Blowfish’s block size is 64-bit long. Length of the variable key is from 1 bit up to 448 
bits [10]. A 16-round Feistel cipher is used and large key-dependent S-boxes are adopted 
as well. It is almost the same as CAST-128 in structure that uses fixed S-boxes. 
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Figure 5: Blowfish cipher encryption 
This diagram above shows the process of Blowfish cipher. Each line stands for 32 bits. 
There are two subkey arrays kept by this algorithm: the P-array containing 18 entries and 
S-boxes which have four 256-entries. The S-boxes take an eight-bits-long input and 
generate a 32-bits-long output for the P-array. Every round there is one entry of the P-
array would be used, and then after the final round, one of the two remaining unused P-
entries is xored with each half of the data block [10]. 
The diagram shows Blowfish's F-function, this function divides the 32-bit input into four 
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quarters in the length of eight-bit each, which then are introduced to the S-boxes as input. 
At the end, the outputs of S-boxes are added modulo 232, and then a final 32-bit output is 
produced by xoring the result. 
Similar to the encryption process, P1, P2... P18 are applied to the decryption process in 
the reverse order. It is quite unobvious since xor is associative and commutative. It is one 
of the common mistakes to adopt reverse order of encryption as decryption algorithm (for 
example: the first cipher text block is produced by xoring P17 and P18, then the P-entries 
are used in reverse order). 
By initializing the S-array and P-boxes with values produced from the hexadecimal digits 
of pi without any apparent pattern, Blowfish's key schedule begins. Then the secret key 
starts to cycle the key byte to byte as needed, xored with every input from P-array one by 
one. A 64-bits-long block with all zero is then encrypted by the algorithm as it function, 
whose output as cipher text take place of P1 and P2. The identical cipher text is then used 
to encrypt the new subkeys, and then P3 and P4 are both replaced by the new cipher text. 
This procedure repeats to replace the entire P-array and all input of the S-box. After all, 
the Blowfish encryption algorithm needs to be executed 521 times to produce all these 
subkeys, which means about 4KB of data is computed [10]. 
As a result of the P-array is 576-bits-long, all these 576 bits are xored through the key 
bytes during the initialization, most of the existing implementations support key sizes up 
to 576 bits. But this is absolutely possible. The limit of 448 bits is used to make sure that 
each bit in each subkey relies on each bit in the key [10], since the last four values of the 
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P-array cannot impact any bit of the cipher text. This point is considered as a requirement 
in implementations with variable rounds, moreover this also improves the security against 
the exhaustive search attack, and however it weakens the security that this algorithm 
promises. As a result of the slow initialization of the cipher with every tiny difference of 
the key, Blowfish was borned with a natural defense against the brute-force attacks, 
which really cannot justify any key whose size is over 448 bits long [10]. 
In 1996, Serge Vaudenay found a known-plaintext attack needing 2
8r + 1
 known plaintexts 
to break, where r is the number of rounds [10]. Nevertheless, there is no effective 
cryptanalysis found up to now against the full-round version of Blowfish [34]. 
We adopt Blowfish cipher to encrypt every command sent to the bot, we can efficiently 
prevent being intercepted and the replay probing by using a powerful but not so doubtful 
encryption as SSL/SSH. 
4.2 A timer to slow down response 
A timer implemented to delay the response time, the time between sending out the 
command and observing the response, is one of the effective evasion techniques. By 
using such a timer to delay the response time, a bot can evade one of BotProbe’s 
assumptions which assume the bot would perform the same action after receiving a 
replayed command in a certain time window. So we can implement a random timer to 
generate some random time interval after which the bot will response to a 
preprogrammed command. This approach will easily confuse the BotProbe. If the 
response occurs out of BotProbe’s time window for one round of active probing, this 
respond evade the detection successfully. In another case, if a respond is caught by 
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BotProbe, BotProbe will replay the command and expect the same response after the 
same time interval, which is unlikely to happen due to the randomly generated number 
from our timer. A random time interval will make it hard for the BotProbe to confirm an 
activity is the same response to a replayed command sent by the system itself. This 
unpredictable response would undermine BotProbe’s confidence to confirm a bot 
infection.  
In a word, the random-timer make our advanced bot act more like a human, whose 
activities are unique and natural. 
4.3 Multiple channel communication 
The basic means of communicating to a group of users in an established IRC session is 
through a channel. Channels are the communication medium in an IRC session. Channels 
on a network can be displayed using the IRC command LIST that lists all currently 
available channels on that particular network. Users can join to a channel using the JOIN 
command, in most clients available as /join #channel name. Messages sent to the joined 
channels are then relayed to all other users. 
BotProbe’s P1 and P2 probing techniques assume all the communication happens in one 
single channel, i.e., BotProbe replays the observed command several times to the bot in 
one channel, and check to see if the bot always responds similarly to the same command. 
So if the bot receive a command but response in another new channel, BotProbe could 
not detect anything abnormal, what’s more, if the new channel is randomly picked by the 
Botmaster and Bot, it will make it harder for BotProbe’s P1 and P2 probing techniques to 
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detect any response. BotProbe cannot even detect any identical response. So when a bot 
receive a command from the botmaster, our bot would randomly create and join a new 
channel, based on botmaster’s command. Our bot would leave the current channel after 
notifying the botmaster with the new channel, where the bot would response to the 
command received in current channel. With the randomly-generated channel, it’s another 
possible evasion to make the communication undetectable. 
4.4 Stateful communication 
Moreover, BotProbe’s P1 and P2 probing techniques both assume a stateless C&C 
protocol, i.e., it will keep sending one observed command several times to the clients, and 
the bots are expected always responds similarly to this replayed command. So in our 
implementation, we could create a stateful communication that provide our bots with the 
capability to detect duplicate or replayed commands by including a timestamp or 
sequence number in every command sent. This approach could easily make simple replay 
probing technique ineffective. For instance, when our bot receive a command, it will first 
compare the timestamp received in the command with the current timestamp. Then it will 
determine whether this command is a replayed command or not, based on the difference 
of these two timestamp. If this command is considered as a replayed command, the bot 
will then respond to it with some random normal content, which makes our bot behave 
non-deterministically as a normal human user.  
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5 ActiBot 
We implement a botnet called ActiBot, which is based on the Eggdrop botnet [11]. 
Eggdrop is one of the most popular and best supported, open source IRC bot, designed 
for flexibility and ease of use, and is freely distributable under the GNU General Public 
License (GPL). All features we designed are implemented over Eggdrop. 
An IRC bot is a program that sits in an IRC channel around the clock, keeping it open 24 
hours a day. It looks just like a normal user on the channel, but is usually idle until it's 
called upon to perform a particular function. 
And all our implemented commands are DCC commands. Direct Client-to-Client (DCC) 
is an IRC-related sub-protocol enabling peers to interconnect using an IRC server for 
handshaking in order to exchange files or perform non-relayed chats. Once established, a 
typical DCC session runs independently from the IRC server. The DCC chat service 
enables users to chat with each other over a DCC connection. The traffic will go directly 
between the users, and not over the IRC network. When compared to sending messages 
normally, this reduces IRC network load, allows sending of larger amounts of text at once, 
due to the lack of flood control, and makes the communication more secure by not 
exposing the message to the IRC servers. 
To realize those four features listed in above section, ActiBot adopts the following 
concrete implementations in two DCC commands (.enc and .mul): 
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1. Implement blowfish cipher to encrypt and decrypt the .enc command sent 
from the botmaster to a bot in ActiBot. 
2. Implement a stateful communication, using timestamp as the time/state 
indicator in the .enc command. So the bot could decide how to response to a 
specific command after comparing the receive time and current time. 
3. By using a timer, to slow down the response to .mul command. 
4. Create a multiple channel communication, allowing the bot response to a 
command sent from botmaster in a randomly created new channel after 
negotiation.  
5. Adopt user authentication to identify the botmaster, only receive and response 
to the command sent out by the authenticated user, who is recognized as the 
botmaster. 
5.1 Blowfish cipher 
Blowfish cipher is a build-in feature in Eggdrop Botnet, which is well implemented with 
friendly API. We use tcl script to adopt Blowfish cipher to encrypt a specific DCC 
command named .enc. The symmetric key for encryption and decryption is predefined by 
the user/botmaster, and is stored in a file along with the bot instance. After our bot 
receive .enc this encrypted command, it will use the key to decrypt the command. If the 
content of this command is validated, a preprogrammed response will be launched. 
Otherwise the bot will response with some random content. 
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5.2 Stateful communication 
Timestamp is always a good indicator of state. A timestamp is a sequence of digits, 
denoting the date and/or time at which a certain event occurred. A timestamp is the time 
at which an event is recorded by a computer. Comparing to sequence number, timestamp 
is more efficiency without the need to remember the sequence number in a 
communication session.  
The UNIX epoch (or UNIX time or POSIX time or UNIX timestamp) is the number of 
seconds that have elapsed since January 1, 1970 (midnight UTC/GMT), not counting leap 
seconds (in ISO 8601: 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z). So in ActiBot, we treat this number of 
seconds as an integer, which is easy for the use of comparison and encryption. We 
implement this feature in .enc command for a stateful communication, making the bot 
only response deterministically at the first time when it receives a new .enc command. 
After the first time receiving this command, the bot will turn into the second state which 
means if the bot receive this command again, which will then be considered as a replayed 
command, it will just response with some random text data as a normal human user.  
5.3 Slow down response 
The response time is sensitive information to whatever detection system. If a command is 
detected, the detection system will then keep monitoring the future traffic for the related 
response. If the client does not take any malicious or suspicious action in a certain time 
interval, the detection system would easily be seduced to consider this is a normal 
activity. In this way, as time goes by, the suspicion of detection system is getting close to 
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clear. Then after the suspicion is purged, any malicious action will not be very easy to be 
considered as a sign of bot infection. In ActiBot, we try to use a timer to randomly 
determine the response time to a command, which is between 0 seconds to 100 seconds. 
For instance, after the bot received a command, there is no rush to response to it 
immediately. Our bot will then enable a timer with a random timer interval. And it will 
only response after the random timer interval has elapsed. 
 
5.4 Multiple channel communication 
In ActiBot, we implemented a DCC command .mul, following the format: .mul <prefix of 
the new channel name>, in order for the botmaster to create a new channel for further 
communication with the bots. With this command, botmaster could specify the prefix of 
the name of a new channel. And the bot would create a new channel based on the prefix 
received in the command. After creating a new channel, the bot would notify the 
botmaster with the new channel name, displaying it in the current channel’s chat console. 
Then the bot will leave this channel, and join to the new channel it just created then 
response there. 
We propose this schema to create multi-channel communication. 
1. Botmaster connect to a bot in a DCC channel. 
2. Botmaster send out a DCC command .mul to the bot in such format: .mul 
<#prefix of the new channel>. 
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3. Bot receive the .mul command, and start to decide the rest of the new channel 
name by using a random number generator. 
4. After deciding the name of the new channel by combining the prefix from 
botmaster and the random number generated, the bot notify the botmaster with 
the full name in the chat console, and then leave the current channel. 
5. After 5 seconds, a time interval for the bot and Botmaster to join the new 
channel, the bot will provide the real or malicious response to the 
command .mul receive in previous channel. 
5.5 User authentication 
We use a user file to store the user information. In ActiBot's userfile, the botmaster could 
control who have the access to bots and what access level each of these users could have.  
Ban lists and ignore lists are also contained in the userfile. One of the fundamental things 
is userfile management which we could exploit to effectively use our advanced botnet. 
When the new users first come to Eggdrop, they needs to use the hello command to 
introduce themselves to the application, by which the new users are added to the user list. 
Then the users must set a password by using the pass command once they have been 
added. They need to follow the following command format /msg <botnick> pass 
<password> to set their password. The .chpass command could be used to reset their 
password in the future. 
Once the userfile is setup, each DCC communication could be set up successfully after a 
valid user is identified by Eggdrop Botnet. The scenario is once a connection to the bot is 
established. The user will be prompted for the password, and then placed on the party line 
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(the main chat area) automatically. This feature would prevent some unknown or 
unauthenticated user to send any command to the bot on the test or detection purpose, 
which is the P2 probing technique. 
6. Test scenarios 
Nothing could be better than to test our botnet with the BotProbe. But up to now 
BotProbe is only a prototype system and an experimental article, not a real product in the 
market. The authors of BotProbe are still investigating a more practical, robust, and less 
controversial extensions of active techniques [8]. So we don’t have the luck to test our 
botnet with real active botnet detection system. Hence, we just test our botnet in our 
environment, and try to simulate the test scenarios as genuine as possible. 
6.1 User authentication 
In eggdrop, the first user is recognize as the administrator of a bot and has the privilege to 
give other user access to the bot. And all these setting are store in a userfile protected by 
MD5 cryptographic hash.  
So in our case, we set up our own administrator’s account and use it to control our bot as 
a botmaster. No other user could talk to our bot using DCC chat without the permission 
from botmaster.  
The purpose of this test is to evade the detection probe P3 (Client-Replay-Probing) and 
P5 (Multi-Client-Probing). With both of these two probing, BotProbe will instantiate one 
or several new user(s) that log(s) into the channel and sends some observed commands to 
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the selected clients acting as the botmaster. Hence, with the user authentication, any 
unauthenticated user created by BotProbe will not be allowed to access and detect the bot. 
Only the botmaster and authenticated user could send command to the bots and control 
the whole botnet. P3 and P5 probing technique would fail. 
6.1.1 Scenario #1 
a) Try to access it with an unauthenticated account. 
 
Figure 6: Unauthenticated user login fail 
b) Bot reply with error, denying the access from a strange user. 
6.1.2 Scenario #2 
       a) Try to access the bot with an authenticated administrator account. 
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Figure 7: Authenticated user login 
b) Access accepted, login successfully as a botmaster. 
 
Figure 8: Login succeed 
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6.2 Blowfish cipher 
Encrypting the communication with blowfish cipher can make ActiBot resilient to P4 
(Man-In-The-Middle-Probing). Botmaster could create a symmetric key stored in the user 
file while setting up the whole botnet, so that this key is shared between the botmaster 
and bots. Botmaster then could use this shared key to encrypt the command sending to a 
bot. And bot can also decrypt and read the command with this shared key. In this way, 
ActiBot makes Botprobe hard to read and change any content of the command sending 
from Botmaster to Bot. 
To test the implementation of Blowfish cipher, we use wireshark to capture our packet 
and try to read its content.  
1) Enter a implemented DCC command:  .enc !mal 
2) The bot receive the command which is encrypted by blowfish cipher. 
 
Figure 9: Bot receive an encrypted command 
In the above figure, we can clear see the cipher text of the encrypted command.  
3) In the wireshark, we can intercept the package and see the workload. 
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Figure 10: Encrypted command 
4) The bot receive it and decrypt the command correctly. 
 
Figure 11: Bot decrypt the encrypted command 
6.3 Stateful communication 
In order to evade the P1 (Session-Replay-Probing), we use timestamp as the state 
indicator to establish a stateful communication. We set the threshold to 2 seconds, 
allowing the latency of network delay. 
In order to simulate the P1 replay probing, we set up our botnet to send out an .enc DCC 
command 3 second after the botmaster initiate sending it out. This encrypted command 
also contains a timestamp denoting the date and time when the botmaster initiate this 
action. After comparing the current timestamp from system with the timestamp within the 
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command, which shows this command is generated at 3 or more seconds before, the bot 
would consider this package as a replay package and response with some random content 
in order to evade this detection. The following is the test scenario. 
1) Send the command .enc !mal 3 seconds after the botmaster initiate it. 
2) The bot received such a package and compare the timestamp and find out it 
exceeds the threshold (2 seconds). So the bot consider this is a replay command. 
And it will not try to decrypt this command, then just response to the command 
with some random content. 
 
Figure 12: Being detected by P1 
6.4 High tolerance 
By using P2 (Session-Byte-Probing) detection techniques, the BotProbe monitor will 
permute certain bytes in the observed application command randomly, which is 
challenging the tolerance to typographical error.  
So in order to evade P2 detection, we use the wildcard to increase our bot’s tolerance to 
typographical error. In this way, while BotProbe permutes some bytes of our command, 
the bots in ActiBot will still recognize this as an acceptable command and response to it. 
To test this, we try to input three ―.enc‖ commands with different content, simulating the 
P2 probing. 
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1) Input the wrong format with ―.enc kenny‖, which is not follow the format 
requirement starting with the exclamation mark ―!‖. 
 
Figure 13: Being detected by P2 
The bot didn’t recognize this command, and response with an alert for P2 probing 
and some random content. 
2) Input a correct command with ―.enc !mal‖. 
 
Figure 14: Receive and response to a correct command 
The bot consider it with a validated command and decrypt it successfully. 
3) Input another command with a slight modification ―.enc !laml‖. 
 
Figure 15: Tolerance to a typo in command 
The bot still consider it as a validated command and decrypt it successfully. 
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6.5 Multi-channel with timer-based communication 
Both purpose of slowing down the response time and creating multi-channel 
communication are make it more difficult for BotProbe to capture the response from the 
bots in an ActiBot. 
We integrate the multi-channel communication with timer-based communication in a 
DCC command .mul. With this command, the botmaster requires the bot to response in a 
new channel which is different from the current channel. Since the new channel is 
decided by both the botmaster and the bot, it’s very difficult for a detection system to 
associate this response with the correct command captured in a different channel. 
Moreover, the response is also hard to be considered as a response to a DCC command, 
due to the response time is longer than usual. Even the response is a malicious action, 
which would draw the BotProbe’s attention; BotProbe has to take a lot of effort to find 
out the exact corresponding command before performing any active detection. For 
example to replay the command and wait for the expected same response from the bot, if 
the replayed command is not the correct command, the bot in ActiBot will give out a 
different response, which decrease the confidence of Botprobe to recognize it as a bot. 
1) Our bot join in the channel #testBot.  Botmaster is talking to the bot in this 
channel.  
2) Input the command: ―.mul #testMul‖.  ―#testMul‖ is the prefix of the new channel 
name decided by Botmaster. 
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Figure 16: To join a new channel 
The bot receive this command, and decide the rest of the name of new channel 
with a random number, which in our case above is eighty-six. Then notify the 
Botmaster before it leave. 
3) The bot appear in the new channel ―#testMul82‖ and leave the old channel. After 
5 seconds, in the new channel #testMul82, the bot response to the .mul received in 
the old channel #testBot. 
 
Figure 17: Bot appears in the new channel 
7. Conclusion and future work 
In this paper, we discussed and analyzed ActiBot, a botnet designed to evade active 
detection. Specifically ActiBot was designed to evade the BotProbe active detection 
system [8]. We considered the active botnet detection techniques employed by BotProbe 
and discussed their limitations. The design of ActiBot was then discussed, and we 
analyzed ActiBot from the perspective of active detection. 
It is important to note that the purpose of this paper is not to encourage malicious 
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activities. Instead, we hope to lay the foundation for further research into botnet detection. 
We plan pursue such research in the future. 
We believe that ActiBot would easily evade all of the active detection techniques 
employed by BotProbe, with the exception of the explicit-challenge-response. 
Overcoming this limitation would become a focus of further work of ActiBot. Of course, 
we also plan to pursue improved detection mechanism that can be used to detect ActiBot 
and similar botnets. 
There is no doubt that active botnet detection is promising in the realm of botnet 
detection research and market. But Active botnet detection definitely could be improved 
and augmented by learning from some passive botnet detection approaches. For example, 
BotProbe could utilize the database of abnormal behavior defined by some other botnet 
detection system, so that BotProbe could improve its efficiency in detecting some known 
botnets even without actively probing the bots’ communication.  
Other than this, botnet detection research should utilize the advantages of both active 
botnet detection and passive botnet detection in improving the defect of both detection 
approaches. 
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